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Implications of the One-Child Family Policy on
the Development of the Welfare State in the
People's Republic of China
FERNANDO CHIU-HUNG CHEUNG
The University of California, Berkeley
The one-child family policy in China, if successfully implemented, will
drastically alter the population age structure in the coming years which
will in turn affect the demand and supply of the welfare state. Using
several population indices projected on the basis of different total fer-
tility rates, it is found that the aged population will increase signifi-
cantly and hence their needs for social services including social security
and health care will increase accordingly. Because the responsibility
for caring for the old in China still largely falls on the family, it is
important to establish an universal social security system supported by
the State in order to reduce fertility. On the other hand, because the
baby boom cohort in the 1960s are entering their adult ages, the labor
force will continue to grow and maintain at a high level for at least
another forty years, despite the decline in birth rate. While the shrink-
age of the young will offset part of the increaasing burden of the
elderly, the government must develop an universal social security sys-
tem and improve occupational welfare, child care, and higher education
in the near future in order to achieve the goals of the four moderni-
zations as well as population control.
China,1 in many respects, is not a country to be taken lightly.
It is now the most populous country in the world and its pop-
ulation accounts for about 22%2 of the total population in the
world. A combination of the population of the Soviet Union and
the United States only barely exceeds 50 per cent of China's 1982
total (Tien, 1983, p. 3). Therefore, China's population growth
and the degree of control exercised over it will have a substantial
impact on the overall trend of world population growth and on
world population problems in general.
Given China's vast population size and its backward eco-
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nomic state (China's per capita GNP in 1979 is US$253), several
questions quickly come to mind: how does China support her
population? what is the general welfare of the people? and how
will future population change affect the development of the wel-
fare system in China?
In order to tackle the crisis of population explosion, leaders
in Beijing, in 1979, launched the most ambitious population
control campaign in human history-the "one-child family pol-
icy." Its goal is to limit the number of children per couple to
one. If successfully implemented, China's population will begin
to drop in the next century. The policy will, no doubt, have
profound effects on the population structure which in turn will
affect the demands and resource base (supply) of the welfare
state in China.
The purpose of this paper is to explore and predict the effects
stated above. First, we briefly review the current welfare system,
which is followed by a brief discussion of the emergence of the
one-child family policy (OCFP). Several population indices are
calculated based on the population projections produced by sev-
eral Chinese demographers (Sung, Tien, Yu, and Li, 1982). Using
these indices, we are able to predict the implications of popu-
lation change on the development of the welfare state in China.
The Chinese Welfare State-a Brief Overview
The welfare state of many Western societies has developed
to an extent that individuals are being cared for by the state
from "cradle to grave." In socialist China, the welfare of indi-
vidual citizens is also said to be a major concern of the govern-
ment. Premier Zhao Ziyang declared in a recent report that the
fundamental purpose of socialist construction is to meet the
growing material and cultural needs of the people (Zhao, 1981,
p. 60).
In reality, the Chinese government has done a reasonable
job in providing housing, education, health care, and other forms
of material relief or welfare to its vast population. In less than
forty years, China has lifted herself from extreme poverty to a
hopeful developing country. The life expectancy of its people
was raised and infant mortality dropped dramatically. Housing,
education, health care, child care, and other services are made
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universal to many who are in need. Limited provision of serv-
ices to the physically and mentally handicapped and to the poor
are also available.
Although some general principles seem to apply to social
welfare programs and services both in rural and urban China,
it would be practical to look at them separately because there are
fundamental differences between them.
Rural Welfare
China has remained an agrarian society where 80% of its
population live in rural areas. Welfare and social services are
delivered largely through the collective sector in rural China.
The basic structure of the rural collective sector is composed of
the people's communes, production brigade, and production
team. 3 Most social services and welfare are delivered through
the production team, which is the smallest unit in the commune
system.
Responsibility for caring for the old, the weak, the young,
and the handicapped largely falls on the family. Aids are re-
stricted to only a few who are in extreme need. Long term as-
sistance is given to less than 5% and usually about 1% of the
population (Davis-Friedmann, 1983, p. 609). Several character-
istics are summarized about welfare services in rural China:
1. The family bears the major responsibility for care for its mem-
bers. Usually, only those who are either very old or completely
disabled (including the blind, the deaf, the mentally ill, etc.)
and lacking both the ability to work and responsible kin to care
for them are eligible for aid.
2. Loans or partial grants, both in kind and in cash, are available
only on a short-term basis to solve a temporary crisis.
3. The standards of assistance depend on local economic condi-
tions and they vary greatly among production teams and
communes.
4. Institutional care is very rare.
The primary long-term welfare assistance in rural China is
the system of 5-guarantees. It guarantees (a) enough food,
(b) enough clothing, (c) enough fuel, (d) an honorable funeral,
and (e) free medical care. 4 The production teams are responsible
to deliver the program with financial assistance from the bri-
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gades and communes. Based on some field observations and
interviews of former residents of the mainland, Davis-Fried-
mann (1983, p. 609) draws four generalizations about the
5-guarantees welfare system:
1. The majority of recipients of 5-guarantees are old women.
2. The 5-guarantees do not cover all expenses; most recipients seek
work or establish special relationships with other villagers.
3. Most efforts to establish personal ties to supplement the
5-guarantees resemble family rather than friendship relations.
4. Rural welfare programs are not necessarily more successful or
more generous in rich villages than in poor.
Urban Welfare
Urban welfare services are based on government laws and
regulations in the socialist sector of the economy. In other words,
social welfare and services in urban China are largely welfare
or benefits related to work. Generally speaking, urban residents
enjoy a much higher living standard and receive much more
welfare and services than those who live in rural China. Major
welfare delivery agents are the work units, trade unions, and
neighborhood organizations.
The quality of welfare and services one enjoys depends on
the occupation group to which he or she belongs. Vermeer (1979,
pp. 864-5) distinguishes five occupational groups in urban
China: (a) cadres and political elites; (b) staff, workers, and em-
ployees of the State-owned enterprises; (c) contract workers and
temporary workers who have been hired for a definite period
by a State enterprise; (d) subcontract workers, organized in
neighborhood committee factories or in suburban communes;
and (e) the unemployed.
Within the class of cadres and political elites, one can still
make a distinction between three groups: (a) a few hundred
remaining survivors of the Long March, (b) Party members who
joined before the Party took power in 1949, and (c) new mem-
bers (35 million). The same order also aplies to the social and
political positions of these three groups and the amount of wel-
fare and services to which they are entitled. Together with the
People's Liberation Army, they are considered the elites of
Chinese society on the mainland and enjoy the highest level of
welfare and benefits.
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The second occupational group, employees of State-owned
enterprises, is entitled to a full range of social welfare schemes
including workmen's compensation, maternity benefits and old-
age pensions. This group constitutes the majority of the working
force in urban China.
The third and fourth group do not participate in regular
State-regulated social welfare schemes and "will not receive any
bonuses, nor will they enjoy services provided by the factory
such as housing, training programs, theater tickets, and other
recreational facilities" (Vermeer, 1979, p. 865). However, they do
receive a social welfare scheme which is less comprehensive than
that of the State-owned enterprises.
The fifth group, the unemployed, mainly urban youth, re-
ceive no specific welfare. Their parents or families are supposed
to take care of them. If they are legal residents of the city, they
continue to receive rations for food and clothing. The govern-
ment has sent some 17 million youths from the cities to rural
areas to relieve the burden of urban unemployment since 1969.
This practice was stopped in the late 1970s and a number of
dissatisfied youths who were being sent to the countryside came
back to cities illegally. The illegal residents do not receive any
welfare or help from the government and have to depend entirely
on their families or relatives.
The following characteristics serve as a summary of urban
welfare practice in China:
1. Pensions, disability benefits, and other social security programs
exist not as rights for everyone but as privileges to be earned
through work.
2. How much social welfare and services one is entitled to depends
on the occupational group to which he or she belongs.
3. When benefits have not been earned, direct public assistance
is to be given only as a last resort.
4. The management of welfare benefits is decentralized down to
work units and neighborhoods (Whyte & Parish, 1984, pp. 71-
76).
Summary
Major welfare and social services in China are centered
around the work place. Those without employment receive early
minimum support from the government if they cannot be sup-
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ported by their families. Everybody is expected to work and
contribute to society. The family is still a major source of support
for its members. The state intervenes only when all sources of
help are exhausted. Elderly people without pensions may receive
welfare only when their family and relatives cannot support
them. The same practice applies to the handicapped, and the
widowed. In general, the welfare and service delivery system
is highly decentralized. As remarked by Vermeer, "provision of
social welfare is, in the first place, a duty of small groups (family,
village, factory), and only after that fails does the State take over"
(Vermeer, 1979, p. 879). Thus the Chinese government has
avoided the creation of an extra bureaucracy to administer the
welfare services. In addition, the living standard of the public
is maintained at or above the level of subsistence without having
to draw too much resources from the State.
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According to the 1982 census, there are 1,031,822,511 people
in China which accounts for about 22% of the total population
in the world. China has become the world's first "demographic
billionaire." The figure reflects an increase of 314 million in the
18 years since the last census in 1964 (Tien, 1983, p. 3). The huge
size and large annual growth of China's population have aroused
anxieties among policy makers and scholars.
Before 1949, "China's population growth pattern was char-
acterized by a high birth rate, a high mortality rate and a low
natural growth rate" (Qian, 1983, p. 295). After the founding of
the PRC, the population expanded rapidly. Improved health care
services resulted in a substantial decline in mortality rates and
infant mortality. However, the birth rate remained at a fairly
high level from 1949 to 1970 (above 33%). Combining these
factors inevitably led to a high natural growth rate in the first
two decades of new China.
Since 1971 China has become more pragmatic about its pop-
ulation policy and committed to control its population. The cam-
paign of "wan xi shao" or "later, longer, and fewer" was launched
to establish the three reproductive norms of "late marriage
(mid-20s for women; late 20s for men), longer intervals between
births (three to four years), and fewer children-no more than
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two per family in cities and three in rural areas" (Tien, 1983,
p. 5). Between 1970 and 1979, China was able to lower the birth
rate from 33.59 to 17.90 per thousand, a decrease of 46.7%. The
natural growth rate also dropped dramatically from 25.95 to 11.7
per thousand (a decrease of 54.9%) (Qian, 1983, p. 297).
Despite their success in bringing down the natural growth
rate of the population, Chinese officials came to realize that the
large number of people born during the 1960s and early 1970s
are now in their marrying and child-bearing ages; therefore
"even a two-child family would mean continuing population
growth for at least half a century" (Tien, 1983, p. 5). Leaders in
Beijing realize that the size of the population has to be further
reduced if any success of their four modernizations s can be
achieved. Vice Premier Chen Muhua reports about the burden
of the vast population on the national economy and on individ-
ual couples:
"With over 900 million persons, even a small rise in each individ-
ual' demand will produce a shocking large aggregate figure.
(Moreover) at the present time, the cost of raising an infant to 16
years of age is about 1,600 yuan 6 in rural villages and 4,800 yuan
in medium-sized cities and small towns, and 6,900 yuan in large
cities ... Based on these figures, the accumulated total cost to the
state, the collective, and families for raising the 600 million persons
born since liberation has been more than 100 billion yuan-or
about 30 percent of the accumulated total national income over
those years" (Chen, 1979).
Thus the Chinese government embarked on a vast and am-
bitious experiment: the creation of a nation of one-child fami-
lies. If successful, the structure of Chinese society will change
drastically; the traditional social network will disappear; the size
of China's population will be maintained and begin to fall in the
next century.
Sichuan, the most populous province of China, started to
adopt the policy of "one-child" in early 1979 under the leadership
of Zhao Ziyang, then the governor of the province. By 1982, the
"one-child" policy was widely adopted throughout China. The
legal base of the policy was also written in the new 1982 Con-
stitution: "The state promotes family planning so that population
growth may fit the plans for economic and social development,"
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and "both husband and wife have the duty to practice family
planning" (Tien, 1983, p. 13). And the Marriage Law also states
that "late marriage and late childbirth should be encouraged"
(Qian, 1984, p. 19).
The current population policy in China is three-fold: (a) to
encourage each couple to have one child, (b) to strictly control
second births, and (c) to resolutely forestall third births (Qian,
1984, p. 19).
By 1985, according to a nation-wide survey, there are
35,000,000 only children in China. One-child families now com-
pose 21.2% of all Chinese families with children (Health and
Family Planning News, 1985). The goal of the policy, however,
is far from being attained. Chen Muhua, Vice-Premier and then
the Director of the State Birth Planning Commission, stated in
1980:
"We will try to attain the goal that 95 per cent of married couples
in the cities and 90 per cent in the countryside will have only one
child in due course, so that the total population of China will be
controlled at about 1.2 billion by the end of the century" (People'
Daily, 1980)
Rewards and Penalties
The OCFP involves a set of incentives to those who are will-
ing to accept the single-child certificates and disincentives to
those who do not. Amounts and levels of rewards and penalties
vary from province to province. In rural areas, the package of
benefits to those couples who have accepted the single-child
certificate typically covers these items (Davin, 1985, pp. 48-9):
1. A nutrition or welfare allowance reckoned monthly in cash (typ-
ically 5 yuan) or in workpoints from the birth of the child or
the time when the parents sign the one-child pledge.
2. A single payment, typically 20 yuan, but was reported as high
as 300 yuan.
3. Paid maternity leave or extra paid maternity leave.
4. An allocation of a private plot of land and housing land for the
single-child family equal to that normally given for two chil-
dren, or where land is short, 1.5 children.
5. A full adult grain ration.
6. Free medical, educational, and kindergarten facilities for the
child.
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In the cities, single-child certificate holders receive similar
rewards. In addition to a cash health or welfare subsidy paid by
the work units, the single child "has priority of admission to
nurseries, schools, hospitals, clinics and in job allocation and all
educational and medical fees from birth onwards are to be waived
or at least reduced" (Croll, 1985, p. 29).
There is also a set of penalties being imposed for a third
child and sometimes even on the birth of a second child. These
economic sanctions are usually carried out more strictly in urban
than in rural areas. In the countryside, examples of penalties
indude, as observed by Davin (1985, p. 50):
1. A deduction of 20% of the couple's income to apply from the
date when a second pregnancy is discovered. The deduction is
repaid if abortion is accepted.
2. A deduction of a set percentage (5% in Sichuan, 10% in Shanxi)
of the couple wages until the child reaches a specified age (7
in Shanxi and Qinghai). This is less severe than the level of
urban penalties, presumably because many peasants live so
close to subsistence that higher rates were thought unnecessary
and perhaps unenforceable. Deductions from income are set at
even higher levels for the third, fourth and subsequent children.
3. No per capita allowance of grain, private plot, responsibility
plot or housing land for children born outside the plan.
In the cities, "regulations permit employment units to deduct
5 to 10% of the total income of a couple for somewhere between
ten and sixteen years after birth, a proportion which rises to
15% for a fourth and 20% for a fifth child" (Croll, 1985, p. 30).
The costs of the birth and subsequent medical and educational
expenses of the second child are borne by the family. Moreover,
couples who gave birth to more than one child are "not eligible
for promotion or a bonus for a number of years and cannot
apply for subsidies in case of hardship" (Croll, 1985, p. 30).
Finally, single-child certificate holders who are found to have
violated the single-child rule will have to pay back all the ben-
efits they have received.
As in other countries, the population control policy is more
successful in urban than rural areas. It was reported that the
proportion of first births in urban China has reached 83% and
62.3% in rural areas (Health and Family Planning News, 1985).
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Summary
Since the founding of the PRC, the population in China be-
gan to grow rapidly. The population continues to grow because
the birth rate has remained high (33 per thousand) for a long
period of time (1949-1970) and there was a substantial decline
in the mortality rate (from 20 per thousand before 1949 to about
7 per thousand in early 1970s). In the early 1970s the government
began to take serious steps to control the population.
By the late 1970s, the birth rate dropped considerably. How-
ever, since there was a huge baby boom in the 1960s and the
cohort is entering into marrying ages in the 1980s, Chinese of-
ficials realize that a second boom will come if they do not further
limit the number of births per couple. There were also concerns
that the backward state of agriculture may not be able to keep
up with the number of mouths to be fed. Thus the government
launched a most ambitious program to control its population
growth-the OCFP campaign. Rewards and penalties are being
imposed on every couple to encourage the practice of only hav-
ing one child in each family. So far the campaign is relatively
successful and is more effective in urban than in rural areas.
Implications of OCFP on the Welfare State Development
The extent to which the OCFP is successfully implemented
will have different effects on the age structure of the population.
The age structure, on the other hand, will have profound effects
on the supply and demand of the welfare state (e.g. national
budgets on pensions and health care services for the aged).
The median age of China has remained relatively stable from
the 1950s to 1970s. However, if the fertility rate continues to
decline and the mortaliity rate remains low, the proportion of
elderly population will increase rapidly. Ansley Coale estimates
that by 2035, given that the decline of fertility is fast enough to
reach zero population growth by the year 2000 (the original tar-
get of the one-child family policy), about one-quarter of the total
population would be over age 65 (Coale, 1981, pp. 85-97).
Here, different projections of indices are calculated based on
the population estimates produced by Song and his associates.
These indices can help evaluate and project future changes in
the welfare state in China. They are, namely, labor force index,7
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child dependency index, 8 aged dependency index, 9 dependency
index, 10 and the young and old ratio" (Song. et al., 1982; 1985).12
The ideal goal of the One-Child family policy is to achieve
a total fertility rate of 1 (B =1); or in other words, one child per
couple. However, it is unlikely that the Chinese officials can
keep such a low fertility rate throughout the whole country.
Therefore, the fertility rate of 1.5 is a more feasible goal for
China. If unexpected resistance or difficulty is encountered dur-
ing the implementation of the population control policy, the total
fertility rate may easily reach 2.0. The projections in tables 1 to
3 are based on these three different total fertility rates (TFR).
Elderly Services
Comparing the percentages of the aged population under the
three different TFRs, one finds large variations in the year 2030.
In fact, the differences among them increase as time extends.
China will have almost one third of its population reach the age
of 65 or over by 2030 if the TFR (B) remains at one until that
time. For B =1.5, the elderly population will account for 23.9 per
cent of the total population, and 19.1 per cent for B =2 in 2030.
The aged dependency index reflects a similar trend. If we
Table 1
China: 50-Year Projections of Population Indices, 1980-2030. B =1.0
% of % of Old & Labor Child Aged
Children Aged Young Force Dependency Dependency Dependency
Year 0-14 65+ Ratio Index Index Index Ratio
1980 33.2 5.1 0.15 61.7 0.54 0.08 0.62
1985 25.5 5.8 0.23 68.7 0.37 0.08 0.45
1990 18.4 6.7 0.34 74.9 0.25 0.09 0.34
1995 15.4 7.6 0.48 77.0 0.20 0.10 0.30
2000 14.6 9.0 0.62 76.4 0.19 0.12 0.31
2005 14.3 10.3 0.72 75.4 0.19 0.14 0.33
2010 12.7 11.8 0.92 75.5 0.17 0.16 0.33
2015 10.5 14.6 1.30 74.9 0.14 0.20 0.34
2020 8.8 19.0 1.90 72.2 0.12 0.26 0.38
2025 7.8 22.6 2.80 69.6 0.11 0.33 0.44
2030 7.5 29.6 3.80 62.9 0.12 0.47 0.59
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Table 2
China: 50-Year Projections of Population Indices, 1980-2030. B =1.5
% of % of Old & Labor Child Aged
Children Aged Young Force Dependency Dependency Dependency
Year 0-14 65+ Ratio Index Index Index Ratio
1980 33.2 5.1 0.15 61.7 0.54 0.08 0.62
1985 25.8 5.7 0.22 68.5 0.38 0.08 0.46
1990 20.5 6.5 0.32 73.0 0.28 0.09 0.37
1995 19.6 7.2 0.37 73.2 0.27 0.10 0.37
2000 20.3 8.3 0.41 71.4 0.28 0.12 0.40
2005 19.7 9.4 0.48 70.9 0.28 0.13 0.41
2010 17.4 10.5 0.61 72.1 0.24 0.15 0.41
2015 15.0 12.8 0.86 72.2 0.21 0.18 0.39
2020 13.5 16.3 1.20 70.2 0.19 0.23 0.42
2025 13.2 18.8 1.42 68.0 0.20 0.28 0.48
2030 13.2 23.9 1.88 62.9 0.21 0.38 0.59
Table 3
China: 50-Year Projections of Population Indices, 1980-2030. B =2.0
% of % of Old & Labor Child Aged
Children Aged Young Force Dependency Dependency Dependency
Year 0-14 65+ Ratio Index Index Index Ratio
1980 33.2 5.1 0.15 61.7 0.54 0.08 0.62
1985 27.0 5.6 0.21 67.4 0.40 0.08 0.48
1990 23.4 6.3 0.27 70.3 0.33 0.09 0.42
1995 24.2 6.8 0.28 69.0 0.35 0.10 0.45
2000 25.0 7.7 0.31 67.3 0.37 0.11 0.48
2005 24.0 8.5 0.35 67.5 0.36 0.13 0.49
2010 21.5 9.4 0.44 69.1 0.31 0.14 0.45
2015 19.3 11.1 0.58 69.6 0.28 0.16 0.44
2020 18.6 13.8 0.74 67.6 0.28 0.20 0.48
2025 18.8 15.4 0.82 65.8 0.29 0.24 0.53
2030 18.7 19.1 1.02 62.2 0.30 0.31 0.61
a'. .*
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take the middle projection (B =1.5), the aged dependency index
will rise from 0.08 in 1980 to 0.38 in 2030. In other words, every
person in the labor force in 2030 will have to support 0.38 old
people whereas the current burden is only 0.08.
This dramatic increase of the aged dependency index may
imply a serious threat to the supply side of the welfare state.
Fortunately, the tremendous drop of the child dependency index
will offset at least part of the burden. In addition, the entering
of the baby-boom cohort into the labor force in the coming years
will maintain the labor force above 68 per cent of the total pop-
ulation at least until 2020. Therefore, the overall dependency
ratio will fall rather than rise in the coming ten to twenty years,
depending on the TFR.
On the other hand, although the increase of the aged pop-
ulation may not increase the burden on the labor force in the
coming one or two decades, it certainly implies a rise in the
demand for elderly services.
At present, most Chinese elderly can only turn to their fam-
ilies, relatives, or friends for help if they cannot support them-
selves. The state is taking a very limited responsibility in
providing services to the aged population. This is especially true
in rural China where most people do not benefit from the pen-
sion system offered by the state to its employees. The elderly in
the countryside have to depend on their married sons, as they
have traditionally. Married daughters are considered as mem-
bers of the sons-in-laws families and therefore do not bear much
responsibility for supporting their own parents. Thus one could
easily understand why it is very difficult for couples to limit
their birth to only one child if the child turns out to be a girl.
Moreover, boys always bring home more money than girls sim-
ply bcause the average income of male workers is higher than
that of the females.
In addition to the threat to financial security in their senior
years, couples in rural China have other reasons to have more
than one child. The introduction of the responsibility system in
the early 1980s has allowed households to become the basic unit
of production. Instead of having to go through the distribution
process through the production teams and brigades, individual
households can now produce and retain their own profits. Si-
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deline businesses are also encouraged. Incomes of those house-
holds with greater labor force quickly pick up and those with
relatively fewer members in the production and more depen-
dents suffer most. It would therefore only be natural for the
peasants to want to have more than one child since more chil-
dren means a larger labor force within the family. 13
With the reluctance of the state to assume more responsi-
bility for supporting the old and the current open economic
policy, the OCFP has created a "catch 22" situation. The success
of the OCFP depends heavily on the effective elimination of the
widespread fears about old-age security among parents of only
children by making pension benefits more widely available. The
expansion of social security, however, implies heavier burden
on the state and hence a slower economic growth. The failure of
the OCFP, on the other hand, will imply rapid population growth
which will in turn retard the economic growth and the devel-
opment of the four modernizations.
In urban China, state sector employees comprise a majority
of the working force (Liu, 1982, pp. 119-129).14 Until the late
1970s, most older workers have preferred work over retirement.
One of the reasons was that many of them had not yet worked
up to twenty years and therefore were not eligible for receiving
the full benefits of their pensions at that time (Liu, 1982, p. 121).
As time extends, more and more state employees will be entitled
to receive full benefits. As the actual number of them grows, the
state has to give a sizable amount of resources to cater to this
growing need.
Child Care
Tables 1 to 3 reveal that the child dependency index will drop
from 0.54 in 1980 to 0.12, 0.21, or 0.3 in 2030, depending on
how successful the OCFP will be. The state will no doubt save
on the cost of nurturing and educating the children because of
the reduction in fertility rate. Currently, such cost to support a
child to 16 years of age is estimated to be 1,600 yuan in the
countryside, 4,800 yuan in small towns, and 6,900 yuan in the
cities (Croll, 1985, p. 24). According to another estimate based
on 1978 data, the average cost is 2,200 yuan. "Raising the 600
million children born since 1949 to the age of 16, therefore, re-
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quires a total expenditure of 1,300,000 million yuan. This is
roughly 30 per cent of the total gross national income over the
period since 1949" (Liu, 1981, p. 9). Table 4 shows the various
levels of costs for nurturing and other basic needs under differ-
ent TFRs in year 2000.
It is estimated that the state will be able to save a sizable
amount of money on supporting the child population in the
coming twenty to thirty years. Even considering the increasing
expenses of the aged population, one Chinese demographer es-
timated that the state can save on the average 10 billion dollars
(RMB) per year until the year 2000 (Tian, 1984, p. 11). However,
it is doubtful whether there can be any true savings because, as
one demographer maintains, "aged dependents have much more
costly needs, particularly for health services, than do young de-
pendents, and their care and nurture poses more serious and
Table 4





arable Average jin school Total
landa(mu of foodgrain annually nurturing
per per person 1996-2000 expenses incurredc
TFR person) per yearb (in millions) (100 million yuan)
3 1.05 618 1.8 9,768
2.3 1.16 682 1.4 6,864
2 1.22 718 1.3 5,453
1.5 1.32 777 0.9 3,410
1 1.42 833 0.7 1,760
aCalculated on the assumption that by the year 2000 the country's arable land
can be maintained at 1.49 billion mu (one mu = 'hs hectare or 1/6 acre)
bCalculated on the basis of a progressive yearly production increase of 10
billion jin (one jin = 0.5 kg or 1.1 lbs.)
eCalculated on the basis of an average of 2,200 yuan in nurturing expenses
for each person born between 1979 and 2000
From "One Married Couple, One Child Seen As Necessity," by Zhu, W.Q.
in Zhongshan Daxue Xuebao Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban (Zhongshan University
Journal, Philosophy and Social Science Edition) 1980, 4, cited in Croll, op.
cit., p. 25.
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more intractable problems than does the care of children" (Aird,
1984, p. 23, 25). It is also important to note that part of the
savings, if there is any, will in turn be used to cover the high
benefit costs of the OCFP. "So far, urban employment units and
rural production teams have been responsible for the monthly
allowances, medical and educational fees, priority housing, and
other benefits promised to one-child certificate holders. These
can be an intolerable drain on the welfare funds of unprofitable
urban enterprises and endanger the living standards of other
families in poor rural areas" (Tien, 1983, p. 36). It is unclear as
to how much these benefits to the one-child couples are actually
costing the state and the collectives; however, the amount may
be substantial.
As far as education for the young is concerned, reduction in
the numbers of children of primary and middle (high) school
ages in both the cities and the countryside will become a general
trend. "The number of urban primary school pupils, around
8,250,000 in the late 1970s, will drop to 7,100,000 by 2000, being
the lowest in 1986 or thereabouts at 4,800,000-a reduction of
42%. The number of middle school students, now 9,690,000
(assuming all children of that age group go to school), after
rising somewhat before 1980 will steadily decline thereafter to
reach its lowest point of 4,750,000 in 1991-a more than 50%
decrease" (Hu & Li, 1981, p. 127). This poses the problem of
how to reallocate the growing surplus of primary facilities and
staff in the coming years.
While the seats of primary and middle schools should be
reduced according to the dedine of need, Chinese officials should
be aware that the current rates of school attendance are relatively
low. According to a national survey in 1983, the school atten-
dance rate for seven year old children is only 62.2%, and 65.3%
for the 14-year-olds. School enrollment in rural areas is also
much lower (78.8%) than in the cities (93.1%) for children be-
tween seven and fourteen years old (National Statistics Bureau,
1985, pp. 19-20). If school enrollment and school attendance
rates are to be pushed up in the coming years, the dedine in
need for primary and middle school education will be less
dramatic.
The same can be applied to the need for nursery care. Cur-
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rently, only 11.3% of all pre-school children (age 0-6) receive
nursery services. The figure is much lower in the countryside
(6%) than in the cities (34.4%) (National Statistics Bureau, 1985,
pp. 19-20). As more and more couples are joining the labor
force, both men and women, there is an increasing need for
nursery care services. With a steady increase in family income,
higher quality services will be in great demand. Therefore, even
as the actual number of pre-school children is decreaasing rap-
idly, the need for nursery services may actually rise and the
quality of such services will need to be improved.
Another possible trend of child care may be that more and
more children will be cared for by their grandparents. Looking
at the old and young ratios under different TFRs (see Table 1-
3), we find the proportion of the aged population will surpass
that of the child in about thirty to forty years. For B=1.5, for
example, every child will have 1.88 elderly to care for them in
2030 whereas the current figure is only 0.22 (1985). This implies
more grandparents are available to care for their grandchildren.
As the cost of nursery care rises, this practice will become in-
creasingly popular.
Services for Adults
Tables 1 to 3 reveal that the adult population (labor force)
will increase rapidly and stay at its peak until 2015. For B=1.5,
the labor force index maintains above 70% from 1990 to 2020.
The dependency ratio can be kept around 0.4 during this period.
This is relatively low when compared to 0.68 of 1978. A Chinese
demographer termed this time the "golden period" for China to
achieve the four modernizations (Tian, 1984). However, a rapid
expansion of the labor force may imply a higher unemployment
rate if the job market cannot accommodate such a large labor
supply or the educational levels or skills of the large labor force
do not match the market's needs.
China has been using the strategy of high employment, low
income, and low cost of living to maintain a minimum living
standard for her vast population. The effort has been quite suc-
cessful. During the 1950s, about 30% or less of the urban pop-
ulation was employed. By the late 1970s, the figure rose to 50 to
55% (Whyte & Parish, 1984, p. 37). In addition, Chinese officials
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have used various policies to tackle or prevent the problem of
unemployment. For example, the send-down of some 17 million
urban educated youths (over 10 per cent of the total urban pop-
ulation) (Whyte & Parish, 1984, p. 39) to the countryside, or
sometimes called the "up to the mountains and down to the
villages" campaign, was at least partly aimed to solve the un-
employment crisis among urban educated youths. Strict migra-
tion regulations are also mainly aimed at preventing rapid
urbanization which will usually result in high unemployment
and crime rates in the cities.
Despite these efforts, China is not exempted from the prob-
lem. "According to Chinese sources, by the start of 1979 there
were 5 to 12 million unemployed persons, which translates into
5 to 11% of the nonagricultural labor force. This is a fairly high
rate for any society, and indicates that even with impressive
controls on migration and labor allocation the battle against un-
employment is not easily won" (Whyte & Parish, 1984, p. 42).
The problem is expected to be more serious in the cities than
in the countryside because most peasants can now engage in
sideline businesses when they are not busy in agricultural
production.
In addition to the increasing burden of unemployment, the
expansion of the labor force also implies more investment on
work-related welfare and benefits. Greater demand for voca-
tional and higher education is likely to be another trend since
the market will need a more skilled labor force as China becomes
more and more industrialized. Putting more youths through
higher and vocational education can also serve to ease the pres-
sure of providing employment for such a huge labor force.
Summary
Using the population projections under different TFRs, sev-
eral population indices are calculated in order to locate future
changes in the supply and demand of the welfare state in China.
Results indicate that the elderly population will increase rapidly.
However, this does not post a heavy burden on the labor force
because of the growing adult population. A drastic decrease of
the child population also implies that the state will save a con-
siderable amount of money in the education and nurturing of
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the young. This saving, however, will be needed to create a
more universal and comprehensive welfare scheme for the el-
derly population. If the OCFP is to be successfully implemented,
the fear of lack of old-age security among the one-child parents
in rural and urban China has to be eliminated. This can be done
only by a higher commitment to support the elderly on the part
of the state.
On the other hand, the age structures created by the OCFP
will give a "golden period" for China's four modernizations and
economic growth in the coming 35 years (from now till 2020).
The high labor force and relatively low dependency ratio imply
that a large resource base, at least in terms of manpower, is
available to China. However, this may also lead to more serious
unemployment problems and greater demands for work-related
benefits and rising need for vocational and higher education.
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Footnotes
1. Hereafter China refers to the People's Republic of China.
2. This does not include the population of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.
3. This is a three-level rural organization with the team as the basic, and
the brigade as an intermediate organization, and the commune at the top.
They are both political and economic entities at the grass-roots level of
rural China. However, with the recent introduction of de-collectivization
and responsibility system, communes have begun to lose their functions.
For detail explanations of the commune system, see William Parish &
Martin Whyte, 1978, pp. 30-43.
4. In some instances, the fifth guarantee is listed as education for children
rather than medical care.
5. The modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science
& technology.
6. Then, one yuan roughly equals to US$.67.
7. The labor force index is the ratio between the labor force (the population
of age 15 to 64) and the total population.
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8. The child dependency index is the ratio between the children population
(the population of age 0 to 14) and the labor force.
9. The aged dependency index is the ratio between the aged population (the
population of age 65 or over) and the labor force.
10. The dependency index is the ratio between the number of people with
no working ability and the population of the labor force.
11. The young and old ratio is the ratio between the population of the aged
and the children.
12. These indices were also used by Song and his associates. For further
explanations of these indices, please see Song, et al., 1982; and Song, J.,
Tuan Chi-Hsien, & Yu Jing-Yuan, 1985.
13. Note that children in rural China can become economically productive
as early as age ten.
14. However, the urban state sector only comprises 19% of the total labor
force in China.

